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Introduction
As its title indicates, Jean-Numa Ducange’s first book is simultaneously a work of
transnational and one of  comparative history. La Révolution française et la social-
démocratie studies the influence of  the French Revolution on the Social
Democratic Party of  Germany (SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and
the Social Democratic Party of  Austria (SDAPÖ – Sozialdemokratische Partei Öster-
reichs) from 1889, the last year of  Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Laws, until the out-
lawing of  the SDAPÖ, in February 1934. Founded in 1890, the SPD, which still
exists to this day, has dominated the German Left for most of  the twentieth cen-
tury. Similarly, the SDAPÖ (founded in 1889) and now known as the SPÖ
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs), has been a fixture in Austrian politics for
more than a hundred years. Although the 1890s inaugurated an era of  increasing
political legitimacy for the SPD and the SDAPÖ, it took the two socialist tradi-
tions almost fifty years to reconcile their different schools of  socialism. 
Not surprisingly, these parties’ ideological platforms have changed
greatly since the period under study. In the late nineteenth century, the Austrian
and German Social Democratic parties were dominated by Marxist ideas. They
gradually moved away from Marxism in the interwar period and eventually shed
most of  what was left of  that ideology after the Second World War.
In the course of  this work, Ducange not only examines the appropria-
tion and, to some extent, the invention of  traditions, but also attempts to com-
pare two political organisations whose histories paralleled each other but differed
in many regards. The book describes the Social Democrats’ efforts to legitimise
their parties by establishing ideological links with figures, events, and movements
of  the French Revolution as a “moment important de l’histoire du marxisme et
des traditions d’interprétations de la Révolution française.”1 Most notably, the
debates that took place regarding that event’s place within the SPD and the
SDAPÖ mirrored the ideological heterogeneity that characterised the European
socialist parties of  that period.
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The layout of La Révolution française rests on a three-pronged design.
While its overall structure is organised chronologically, each chapter includes the-
matic and prosopographical sections. Throughout his study, Ducange uses the
works of  Karl Kautsky, a major Social Democrat leader and thinker, as a means
to assess the roles that the French Revolution fulfilled in the two parties.
However, La Révolution française does more than merely describe the debates that
were taking place among party leaders and intellectuals. Based on impressive
research, this work also explores the uses of  that event as an instrument of  com-
munication and education in Social Democratic circles. 
A Multilayered, Ambitious Work
The events that unfolded in the Twentieth century have changed Germany’s
national narrative in so many ways that the first half  of  the Nineteenth century
ended up being obscured as a result. However, it has to be recognised that the
early nineteenth century undoubtedly saw the genesis of  the economic and, ulti-
mately, political unification of  the German states. The World Wars, the Nazi
regime, and the Cold War experiences have, justifiably, led historians of
Germany and, more generally, the media, to explain anew the trajectory of
German history and formulate new narratives. This focus on the short Twentieth
century, whose ending has been symbolically defined by the fall of  the Berlin
Wall, has weakened the centrality of  the Nineteenth-century as the crucible of
the German nation-building process and turned the 1914-1989 era into one of
(re-)definition of  what constitutes modern Germany.
Nevertheless, historians of  Germany and Austria have not forgotten
the early Nineteenth century. Scholars like David Blackbourne, Geoff  Eley, Tom
Taylor, and others have written extensively on the long nineteenth century (1789-
1914) in Germany and its impact on that country’s national project.2 As far as
Austria is concerned, Barbara Jelavich, Steven Beller, and many more have effi-
ciently analysed that country’s trajectory, from its position as leading power with-
in a multiethnic empire in the early Nineteenth century to that of  unilingual
republic in the wake of  the First World War.3 That said, many of  those histori-
ans’ works have, understandably been coloured by their own Twentieth-century
experiences. 
The books and articles produced during that era, and even in the last
two decades were, in many ways, the products of  their own day and age. The
historiographical debates that took place in the second half  of  the twentieth cen-
tury were dominated by questions related to changes and continuities in German
history, which pitted the proponents of  the Sonderweg (special path) against those
who opposed that view. Much ink has been spilled on Sonderweg, a generic label
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applied to historical theories that consider Germany to have followed a peculiar,
unique historical path. The frequent interweaving of  the two countries’ histories
has contributed to add complexity to these debates. In addition to the historical
and geographical intricacies of  the Sonderweg debates, the relatively fresh memory
of  the Second World War and its impact on Austria and Germany underlay
much of  the historical scholarship produced during the Cold War and even after.
While Ducange belongs to a generation of  scholars that came of  age
after the short twentieth century (1914-1989), his study of  the SPD’s and the
SDAPÖ’s uses of  the French Revolution indirectly participates in the discussion
on the German nation-building experience and, more broadly speaking, that of
Deutschtum (Germanness). More than yet another book on Social Democracy, La
Révolution française deals with two critical, formative periods of  German history.
In the course of  the Second Reich (1871-1918) and of  the Weimar Republic
(1918/19-1933), Germany was still in the process of  national formation. The
political, (sub-)cultural, and religious tensions between the central government in
Berlin and many of  the states that composed the federation riddled the country
until at least 1945, when the Cold War introduced an additional cleavage – one
of  an ideological nature. Although the book does not focus on that aspect of
German history, several of  the themes discussed in it tackle the issue of  national
memory, the appropriation of  foreign events and their mythologizing. In that
regard, the study of  the SPD and its efforts to appropriate the French
Revolution sheds some light on both ideological and national legitimization
processes.
While Ducange barely mentions the Sonderweg controversy, his work
indirectly and perhaps unintentionally explores the lasting impact of  the French
Revolution on the construction of  a German national consciousness. In that
regard, the Austrian and German brands of  Social Democracy constitute perfect,
albeit paradoxical, case studies. In their own ways, the two parties exemplify the
attempts made by many parties and various groups, in Austria as in Germany, to
make sense of  their respective countries’ histories. The fact that the SPD and the
SDAPÖ were essentially internationalist parties makes their interest (even quali-
fied) in the German national project even more interesting. Ducange, though
non-verbose on that aspect of  his work, reminds us that the German national
question was not confined to the various patriotic organisations and circles that
sprung out in the course of  the nineteenth century, but also arose in socialist cir-
cles.4
One of  the many strengths of  La Révolution française, then, is its subtle
analysis of  two parties whose identities were simultaneously German or Austrian
and socialist/social democratic. The importance of  the revolutionary and nation-
al pasts in the SPD’s quest for legitimacy certainly adds an interesting angle to
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the early Sonderweg approach. Indeed, the SPD participated in the construction of
an image of  Germany that was rooted in the context of  a Europe inflamed by
the French Revolution. It may seem, at first, that the Social Democrats’ (and
many of  their opponents’) understanding of  modern Germany as having been
the result of  the Napoleonic Wars implicitly rooted the nation-building project in
a series of  events of  a transnational, all-European nature. 
However, it would be unfair to assume that the German Social
Democrats viewed the path that led to German unification as having originated
in an all-European conflict and, as a result, as not being “special” at all. The
SPD’s and the SDAPÖ’s views on the French Revolution were, to say the least,
ambiguous. To Ducange, the pre-First World War SPD’s status as an “[o]rganisa-
tion de masse représentant une partie grandissante de la population allemande,”
led it to become a Volkspartei (a “people’s party”) before it officially recognised
itself  as such during the Weimar Republic.5 On the one hand, the connection
between what was constructed as the modern German national project and the
new European balance of  power that emerged in 1815 endowed that country’s
pre-unification era with transnational, not-so-peculiar characteristics. However,
by the eve of  the First World War, the Social Democrats had developed a syn-
thetic view on the nature of  their party and its relationship to Germany as a
whole. Whereas the 1789-1792 legacy, acknowledged as having originated on the
other side of  the Rhine, occupied an important place in the SPD’s and the
SDAPÖ’s respective narratives, the two parties were keen to distinguish their
respective experiences from the French one. Far from idealising the French
brand of  republicanism, the two parties tended to favour alternatives to that
model. To the Social Democrats, then, those alternatives had to agree with these
two countries’ natural political structures.6
As far as the Austrian side of  the comparison is concerned, it is obvi-
ous that Ducange dealt with a political and socio-cultural context that differed
substantially from that of  Germany. Although the Austrian Empire had under-
gone a substantial administrative reform in the wake of  its 1866 defeat to
Prussia, thereby becoming Austria-Hungary, it was still considered a great power
in nineteenth-century Europe. Ducange thus had to face a triple challenge.
Firstly, while Germany was experiencing its unification process, Austria-Hungary
had long been a major, well-established player in international affairs. Secondly,
the SDAPÖ was, from its founding onward, forced to adapt to the various
nationalities that composed the Austro-Hungarian Empire.7 As a result, Ducange
had to take into account the challenges inherent to comparing legitimisation
processes in an already established multinational entity with those taking place in
a country that had freshly experienced political unification. Finally, the French
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Revolution did not have as important an impact on Austria as it did on
Germany. For these reasons, a comparative study of  the SPD’s and the SDAPÖ’s
uses of  the French Revolution is bound to be dissymmetrical. 
However, conceptual dissymmetry does not invariably constitute a
weakness and, in some cases, is the sine qua non condition for an efficient com-
parative study. In the present case, Ducange certainly tried to bite off  more than
he (or any other historian) could chew. The Austro-Hungarian Empire would in
itself  have constituted an interesting case study of  a party attempting to define
its purpose and forge its official rhetoric in a multinational country. However,
such a study would have had to end in 1919, when the Austrian Republic was
founded as a consequence of  the collapse of  the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Since Ducange’s book straddles the pre- and post-First World War eras, a focus
on the challenges that the SDAPÖ faced in relation to non-German-speaking
groups in the Empire would certainly have led to unnecessary digressions. That
said, the absence of  any mention of  the Adriatic Italian Section of  the Social
Democratic Workers' Party of  Austria, of  the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party
or of  other autonomist tendencies within the Austro-Hungarian socialist move-
ment is a little problematic.
The Social Democrats and the French Revolution: A Love-Hate
Relationship
The interest of  the SPD and the SDAPÖ in the French Revolution was twofold.
Firstly, as Marxist organisations, the two parties sought to present the Revolution
as a major cog in the dialectical process underlying historical development. As
the historical moment that saw the political advent of  the bourgeoisie, the
French Revolution was, as a result, simultaneously praised as the necessary con-
dition for future, purely proletarian upheavals, and criticised as the reign of  the
capitalist class. As a result, the event served to emphasise the continuities and
changes (for the best) in the forces of  progress throughout history. 
Secondly, the understanding of  the French Revolution as a world-histori-
cal moment in socialist history led the two parties to partake in the mythologising
of  their respective nations. The most glaring example of  such efforts to combine
the legacy of  the Revolution with the emancipating nature of  German unifica-
tion is that of  the Social Democrats’ perspective on the later, Napoleonic phase
of  the event. From the early 1890s until the early 1910s, the years 1800-1815
were not usually recognised by the parties’ theorists as being part of  the
Revolution. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats acknowledged that Napoleon’s
action had been decisive in exporting the revolutionary legacy to the German
states. As Ducange phrases it in his conclusion to a section on the centenary of
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the 1813 War of  Liberation, a phase of  the War of  the Sixth Coalition, “[l]’occu-
pation napoléonienne s’étant rapidement transformée en domination étrangère,
1813 est situé au même niveau que la prise de la Bastille en 1789. A quelques
mois d’août 1914, les sociaux-démocrates assument à leur manière un héritage
national qui se combine, non sans ambiguïtés, avec les références révolution-
naires traditionnelles.”8 The commemoration of  the War of  Liberation thus gave
the German Social Democrats the opportunity to reconcile the dialectical inter-
pretation of  the French Revolution with that of  the national past. 
Not surprisingly, the First World War saw the confrontation of  two
main attitudes towards Social Democracy’s revolutionary heritage. On the one
hand, anti-French (and, sometimes, antiwar) sentiment within the SPD encour-
aged some of  its leaders and propagandists to draw parallels between 1914
France and the Jacobin, bourgeois, warlike nature of  revolutionary France.9 The
emphasis on the negative facets of  the French Revolution did not emerge out of
thin air, in that they complemented the Social Democrats’ attitude during the
commemoration of  the 1813 War of  Liberation. Curiously, however, Ducange
does not explore the 1813-1914 parallelism further. On the other hand, some
Social Democrats abided by a positive view of  the French Revolution. For
instance, the case of  Alsace-Lorraine in the 1790s, where some German and
French revolutionaries worked together, was used to make a case for the univer-
salist, essentially progressive nature of  the Revolution.10
Unfortunately, Ducange is less verbose on the SDAPÖ’s views on the
commemoration of  the 1813-15 War. However, although the absence of  a truly
synthetic section comparing the two parties during the First World War is prob-
lematic, the part devoted to the Austrian Social Democrats in the wartime era is
as helpful as it is brief. In Austria-Hungary, the ambiguity regarding the memory
of  the French Revolution seems to have been similar, in several respects, to the
one that was at play in Germany. Like their German counterparts, some factions
in the Austrian party proved inclined to resorting to a pro-French Revolution
rhetoric. Led by Friedrich Adler, the leader of  the party’s leftwing, “internation-
alist” tendency, the antiwar Social Democrats opposed the “social patriots”.
Adler refused to equate 1789 with 1914. To him, “la bourgeoisie a définitivement
rompu avec les traditions de 1789, mais dans le prolétariat elles ont vécu au
moins jusqu’au début de cette guerre.”11 In Austria-Hungary as in Germany,
then, the Social Democrats were divided in their attitudes towards the French
Revolution. However, that cleavage did not develop along the same lines as the
pro- and antiwar factions that sprung up within the two parties during the First
World War.
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As mentioned in this essay’s introduction, Ducange chose Karl Kautsky
as his book’s central thread. The implicit choice of  Kautsky’s intellectual trajec-
tory as an indicator of  the SPD’s (and, to some extent, of  the SDAPÖ’s) official
stances on the Revolution is appropriate in several ways. A prolific writer,
Kautsky played a decisive part in constructing the SPD’s various perspectives on
the Revolution. Along with other Marxist orthodox thinkers, Kautsky applied
Marx’s and Engels’ scientific reading of  history to that particular period. 
Secondly, Kautsky could be seen as a symbolic link between the
German and Austrian brands of  Social Democracy. Born in Prague in 1854, he
joined the Austrian Social Democrats in the 1870s and, in the 1880s, the
German Socialist Workers’ Party (SAPD – Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei
Deutschlands), the German predecessor of  the SPD during the Anti-Socialist
Laws. It was during the 1880s that he befriended Friedrich Engels, August Bebel,
and other prominent socialist figures and became an expert in Marxist theory. 
Thirdly, Kaustsky straddled several key periods of  socialist history.
Throughout his career, he never ceased to apply Marxist theory to every subject.
This loyalty to the Marxist gospels earned him the nickname of  “pape du
marxisme.”12 His work on the French Revolution provided him with an ideal
opportunity to argue for a class-based analysis of  the event, an approach that
contrasted sharply with that of  Ferdinand Lassalle, whose more conservative
brand of  socialism placed more emphasis on the fourth estate. Indeed, the latter
did not correspond to Marx’s and Engels’ definition of  the proletariat as a social
class alienated from the means of  production. In essence, Lassalle’s fourth estate
consists of  “the disinterested class of  the community, which sets up and can set
up no further exclusive condition, either legal or actual, neither nobility nor land-
ed possessions nor the possession of  capital, which it could make into a new
privilege and force upon the arrangements of  society.”13 Clearly, then, Lassalle’s
definition of  social class, which he uses interchangeably with estate, is broader
than the Marxist one in that it includes craftspeople as well as salaried workers.
Thus, Kautsky’s reading of  the Revolution not only contributed to construct a
Marxist reading of  the event, but also had tactical purposes, including that of
rooting out the relics of  the late Lassalle’s ideas, which had dominated German
socialism from the 1860s to the mid-1870s. 
In addition to enriching the Marxist understanding of  the French
Revolution, the Social Democratic theorists engaged in selecting the aspects of
the period that the two parties could either appropriate or demonise. In that
regard, the initial privileging of  1789-94 as a time frame was symbolic of  the
SPD’s and the SDAPÖ’s partisan portrayals of  major figures and events.
Review Essay 79
Quark 16_2_Left History.qxd  2012-12-21  12:50 AM  Page 79
However, the periodisation changed over time, to the point that the Social
Democrats occasionally extended their time frame to include the Napoleonic era
until 1813, when the occupation of  the German states ended. The propagandists
also created a veritable pantheon, comprising several female figures, like Olympe
de Gouges or Marie-Jeanne Roland, and (usually male) heroes and villains.
Among the latter, Robespierre held the role of  the tyrant who contributed to
ending the progressive drive of the Revolution. On the other hand, Paul Marat,
Gracchus Babeuf  and Paul Hébert were often seen as positive figures, especially
in the pre-First World War era.14
But aside from the Social Democratic leaders’ selective uses of  the
French Revolution, the latter was part and parcel of  the broader issue of  the
place of  dialectical materialism and class struggles in history. In that regard,
Ducange’s analysis of  his topic’s spatial dimension is extremely useful, in that it
provides an interesting perspective on the theoretical and structural divergences
that separated the Austrian and German Social Democrats from the French
socialists. Except for the Guesdists (the name given to the French Marxists), the
French socialists’ views on the Revolution were not so much influenced by
Marxist philosophy. 
Ducange successfully shows that the evolution of  the two parties’
respective approaches to the French Revolution can serve as an indicator of  the
changes in their ideological stances. To be more precise, Ducange sees an initial
period of  interest in the Revolution that began in 1889, a key year in that it coin-
cided with the centenary of  1789, the founding of  the Second International, and
the imminence of  the lifting of  Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Laws. Between 1895
and the mid-1900s, the references to the Revolution knew a decline, mostly due
to the cleavage between orthodox Marxists and the reformist and revisionist wings
of  the two parties. A rigidifying of  the (majority) orthodox Marxist branch of  the
party ensued. Headed by Kautsky, that faction resisted the introduction of  a
bourgeois/republican reading of  the Revolution, which partly contradicted Marx’s
view that historical development followed a dialectical course. Not surprisingly,
then, the works of  Jean Jaurès, one of  France’s most prominent socialist leaders,
met with hostility from SPD and SDAPÖ intellectuals and leaders. Based on a
synthetic view of  historical development inspired by evolutionary and materialist
philosophies, Jaurès saw the Revolution as a generally positive historical moment
that was linked with late-nineteenth century socialism. By contrast, the official
Marxist stance conceived of  the French Revolution as a historical stage dominat-
ed by the bourgeoisie and whose function was to carry the seed of  the modern
proletariat.15 More than purely philosophical, the debates on the place and
nature of  the Revolution had immense political implications, one of  which was
the question of  alliances with bourgeois parties. 
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The 1905 Russian Revolution contributed to a new interest in the
French Revolution. That period was marked by questions regarding the immi-
nence of  a truly proletarian upheaval. Finally, the revolutions of  1917 ushered a
new era in the two parties’ perspectives on the event, more specifically regarding
the question of  the use of  violence. In that regard, the splits that divided the
Marxist left and resulted in the creation of  communist parties encouraged the
Social Democrats to mark their difference from Bolshevism by using the Reign
of  Terror (1793-94) as a cautionary tale. 
Ducange’s analysis is not confined to the SPD’s and the SDAPÖ’s elite
perspectives on the revolutionary legacy. Although the two parties’ leaderships
and intelligentsias defined the ways in which the 1789-1813 era was interpreted,
efforts were made to educate the labouring masses on that particular period of
history. The decision to create Parteischulen (“Party Schools”), in 1906 in Berlin
and in 1910 in Bodenbach, Austria (now Děčín, Czech Republic), did not just
stem from ideological considerations on the need to democratise knowledge.
The growing popularity of  the two parties at the turn of  the twentieth century
required them to train new officers and executives, especially at the local level.
As Ducange rightly points out, while the Social Democratic educational organi-
sations proposed courses on a vast array of  subjects, history and, more specifi-
cally, the French Revolution, occupied an important place in those schools’ cur-
ricula. Although the SPD’s Party School seems to have granted more room to
the teaching of  that topic than its Austrian counterpart did, this part of  the
book takes a broad approach to the two organisations’ views on popular educa-
tion. Indeed, Ducange does not focus his analysis solely on the Party Schools,
but on other means of  spreading knowledge, such as conference tours,
slideshows, and party libraries.16
Although popular education as a vector for party legitimisation gained
in importance in the 1900s, the question of  the democratisation of  knowledge as
a prerequisite to the establishment of  socialism dated back to the early 1860s,
when the German socialist movement was dominated by Lassalle’s ideas. Lassalle
played a major role in developing the idea of Bildung in Social Democratic circles.
Understood in the context of  the Social Democratic subculture, the concept of
Bildung, generally translated as “education” or “learning”, could be defined as a
democratisation of  “l’idéal classique des Grecs du développement des facultés
individuelles, idéal que la bourgeoisie aurait réservé à une toute petite mino-
rité.”17 The teaching of  history, and especially of  periods that were believed to
have played key roles in the development of  socialist ideas, was, as a result, part
and parcel of  Bildung. Thus, it was logical that the teaching of  the French
Revolution should have held a place of choice in the two parties’ communication
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and educational methods.18
Finally, the legacy of  1789 contributed to strengthening Social
Democracy’s more or less invented traditions. Indeed, beyond the realm of  theo-
ry and history, many aspects of  the French Revolution were incorporated into
the SPD’s and the SDAPÖ’s subculture. The May Day ritual, for instance,
though it originated in the United States and was officially adopted by the
Second International in 1889, was often linked with the events of  1789.19 The
Social Democratic press and local sections also regularly appropriated the
Revolution’s lyrical repertoire. Thus, the Arbeitermarseillaise (“Workers’
Marseillaise”) and the Lassalleaise were set to the tune of  Rouget de Lisle’s
Marseillaise.20
Conclusion
In conclusion, La Révolution française et la social-démocratie is extremely well written
and well structured. Aside from a small number of  references that might seem
arcane to those unfamiliar with the French Revolution or the history of
Marxism, Ducange’s prose is jargon-free and engaging. That said, some familiari-
ty with modern European political history and with some of  Marx’s and Engels’
works, such as The Eighteenth Brumaire of  Louis Napoleon and The Civil War in
France, is required. 
Ducange uses a vast array of  sources, such as brochures, plays, contem-
porary scholarly works, epistolary correspondences, newspapers, study group
programmes, and calendars. The research is impressive and the examples chosen
by the author are of  particular interest. From a thematic viewpoint, Ducange
covers many facets of  the subject, such as that of  the emancipation of  women,
the interplay between memory and political identity, and the dilemmas posed by
the issue of  patriotism in an essentially internationalist party. 
The only major shortcoming of  the book has to do with its compara-
tive aspect. Whereas Ducange successfully analyses the uses of  the French
Revolution by the SPD, his exploration of  the same process in the SDAPÖ is
not as thorough. Granted, the author explains that lopsidedness by the fact the
Austrian Empire had not felt the consequences of  the Revolution as much as the
German states.21 However, a deeper analysis of  the changes that affected the
party’s references to the Revolution in the wake of  the 1918-19 insurrections in
Budapest and Vienna would have been helpful. Finally, another aspect that could
have been further strengthened concerns the book’s theoretical premise. For
instance, Ducange’s sporadic references to Eric Hobsbawm’s edited work The
Invention of  Tradition could have been further expanded. 
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Notwithstanding those weaknesses, La Révolution française et la social-démo-
cratie is an important book that not only consists in a solid inquiry into the world
of  European socialism, but also adds fresh perspectives to our knowledge on the
political uses of  the past in general. While other works have dealt with the
Marxist left’s quest for legitimacy through the appropriation of  the French
Revolution (see, for instance, the works of  Tamara Kondratieva and Danielle
Tartakowsky), Ducange’s book raises a host of  questions on the current nature
of  German and, more generally, European social democracy.
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